Joseph Camp points out, in his penetrating comments [1] that the strategy I adopted in "De Re et De Dicto" [2] depends upon the truth of (5) When and only when an individual x has a property P essentially, any proposition that predicates P of xl and is expressed by the result of replacing 'x' and 'P' in 'x lacks PF by a proper name of x and a canonical designation of P will be necessarily false.
that this name is functioning as a proper name in this context; perhaps we should look upon it as an abbreviation for some such definite description as 'the thing Harry was talking about'. This is not to deny, of course, that 'George' is a proper name; proper names do not always serve the function of proper naming. Sometimes, for example, they function as general terms (or fragments thereof), as in "He's a veritable Daniel come to judgment". Indeed, the same name can function both ways in the same sentence; no doubt Daniel himself was a veritable Daniel come to judgment. And perhaps in the situation Camp envisages, our referring to this object as 'George' is no more than a tacit agreement to use that name to abbreviate some such description as the one mentioned above. If so, then of course we have no reason to think that (5) is false.
But why couldn't we use 'George' as a proper name of George in these circumstances? No doubt we could; then, however, I should think that the proposition expressed by (1) would indeed be necessarily false. Of course we might say "Possibly George is a blackboard eraser," and if we did, we'd be right. Unfamiliar with the ways of matrices, I might say, and say quite properly, "Possibly the 201 determinant of the matrix 13 2 is greater than 3." But of course 143 what I say does not imply that the proposition 201 the determinant of the matrix 13 2 is greater than 3 143 is possibly true in the logical sense; I just mean that for all I know its true. Similarly, were we to say, in Camp's circumstances, "Possibly George is an eraser," we wouldn't mean (if we were careful) to assert that the proposition expressed by (2) (taking 'George' therein as a proper name of George) is not necessarily false; we'd be saying only that for all we know it is true. We can see this more clearly, perhaps, if we image Harry's joining our conversation. After telling him that the subject of his earlier remarks has been named 'George' we ask him whether the proposition George is a blackboard eraser is logically possible. If he is willing to answer truthfully, he'll say no. But, says Camp, the clincher is this: the proposition George is a blackboard eraser is a very simple proposition and it seems to me that the best available test for logical possibility in such a case is to try to conceive of a state of affairs or 'world' wherein the proposition would be true. And given the context in which we supposed ourselves to be using the name 'George' we could apply this test to the proposition expressed by 'George is a blackboard eraser' with no trouble at all. For instance we might imagine Harry suffering a change of heart and showing us a blackboard eraser, with the explanation that this is the thing he was talking about.
Crucial to this argument is the claim that the proposition expressed by ( Consider an analogous case: Harry tells us that he's thinking of a number between 1 and 10; in fact he's thinking of 6. Now suppose we use 'Charley' to denote the number Harry's thinking of and ask whether the proposition expressed by (6) Charley is prime is possible. The answer will depend upon whether 'Charley' functions here as a proper name or as an abbreviation for some such definite description as 'the number Harry's thinking of.' If the latter, then the existence of worlds in which Harry is thinking of 7 rather than 6 shows the proposition (6) expresses to be contingent. If the former, however, then the existence of tlhese worlds shows at best that (6) could have expressed a true proposition-i.e., that there are worlds in which it expresses a true proposition. There is nothing here to suggest that the proposition it does express could have been true. Harry knows that (6) expresses a necessarily false proposition. We don't; we know only that thfe proposition it ex-presses is either necessarily true or necessarily false. That (6) is true, i.e., expresses a true proposition, is contingently false; this in no way compromises the fact that the proposition it expresses is necessarily false.
The resolution of Camp's objection, then, is to be seen in the fact that what is usually a proper name does not always function as one. If, for example, we decide for some reason to use 'Socrates' as short for 'the snubnosed teacher of Plato', then (7) Socrates never taught Plato will express a necessarily false proposition. But doesn't this show the definitions of "De Re et de Dicto" to be inadequate? For 'Socrates' is indeed a proper name of Socrates (even if it is not functioning as one in (7)); hence K(Socrates, snubnosedness) will be necessarily false; hence by D4" Socrates will be essentially snubnosed, which is absurd. Or more accurately, K(Socrates, snubnosedness) will not be well defined; there will be at least two propositions about Socrates expressed by the sentence to which it directs us. The trouble, of course, is that while 'Socrates' is indeed a proper name of Socrates, in (7) it isn't functioning as one. But I didn't propose D4" and its confreres as an analysis schema for modality de re, and indeed am not really clear as to just what an analysis is. Nor do I propose these definitions as a means of enabling us to say whatever can be said about the possibility and necessity of things without using de re language. One thing to be said about the necessity of things is that for any object x and property P, x has P essentially if and only if K(x,P) is necessarily false; and I have my doubts as to whether that's the same as saying that for any object x and property P, K(x,P) is necessarily false if and only if K(x,P) is necessarily false.
But 
